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 Dual use of budgeting in uncertainty contexts:  




For many companies, budgets are a key instrument to control behaviour, relying on 
individual target-setting and performance evaluation based on accounting performance 
measures. However, in perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) situations, budgeting 
faces two difficulties: setting realistic objectives in a poorly predictable context while at 
the same time achieving a fair performance evaluation when uncertainty has affected 
results and their controllability.  
Based on prior accounting literature and Simons’ framework (1990, 1995), we explore 
the use of budgets in PEU situations in a qualitative study. We conducted a field-based 
study and interviewed 14 senior sales and marketing managers from various industries, 
using projective techniques imported from psychological research.   
Our field results confirm an interactive use of budgets in PEU situations and highlight 
two practices: (1) intense interactive debate and dialogue at all organisational levels, both 
at target-setting time and throughout the year; and (2) additional use of non-accounting, 
more subjective performance evaluations. However, we also find that beyond this 
interactive use, budgets remain important for short-term performance evaluation and 
achieving the company’s global budgetary objectives. Work-based arrangements 
facilitate this “dual use” of budgeting. Our findings suggest that a process of 
mutualisation—risk- and effort-sharing—takes place, emphasising achievement of the 
company’s overall budgetary objectives promised to the shareholders. This process 
fosters a more collective, global management of uncertainties while simultaneously 
allowing individual performance evaluation.   
  
Keywords:  budgeting - uncertainty – perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU)- 
interactive control system (ICS) – sales and marketing managers. 
  11. Introduction  
In many large companies, budgets are a key control device, relying on individual target-setting 
and performance evaluation based on accounting performance measures. Accounting literature 
on environmental uncertainty has emphasized the limits of budgeting (Govindarajan, 1984; 
Brownell, 1985; Williams, Macintosh and Moore, 1990). In a fast-changing, unpredictable 
environment, budgeting faces at least two difficulties: setting realistic objectives in a poorly 
predictable context while at the same time achieving a fair performance evaluation when 
uncertainty has affected results and their controllability (Hartmann, 2000).  
Consequently, the use of budgeting as a control device, which increases pressure on 
management, should be limited in perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) situations. 
However, studies that have examined the effects of uncertainty on budget emphasis have 
produced conflicting findings: some have shown a limited use while others increased use of 
budgeting-based measures for performance evaluation in PEU situations.  
Besides, uncertainty increases the need for organisational flexibility, as firms must be able to 
adapt to unexpected changes in the environment (Dent, 1987). Simons (1990, 1991, 1994, 
1995, 2000) suggests that some management control devices can be used as interactive control 
systems (ICSs) to enable management to cope with strategic uncertainties. More specifically, 
budgeting could be used as an interactive management control system (MCS), turning goal-
setting and monitoring into a platform for continuous discussion between different management 
layers—action plans and strategies being discussed on an ongoing basis, increasing the 
company’s responsiveness to the external environment. Simons (1995) suggests that a different 
management control device should be used for diagnostic control and performance evaluation. 
He claims that in PEU situations, one MCS
i will be used interactively. However, when the 
budget—“profit planning systems”—is used interactively, formula-based incentives will not 
work and there will be a need for subjective assessment and rewards (Simons, 2000). Simons 
thus acknowledges the difficulty of using a budget both diagnostically and interactively at the 
same time; the issue is about reconciling the conflicting needs for flexibility and formal control 
that increase in PEU situations. 
The use of budgeting in PEU situations deserves further examination. On the one hand, PEU 
may foster an interactive use of budgeting. On the other hand, budgetary objectives remain 
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the complexities of this dual use of budgeting in PEU situations.  
To this end, we conducted semi-structured interviews with senior sales and marketing 
managers from a variety of industries, with the aim of capturing their actual experience. We 
imported projective techniques from psychology-based research and used carefully-designed 
evocative visuals to encourage the interviewees to talk and express their feelings.  
Our findings confirm those of Simons (1995), but also suggest the existence of work-based 
arrangements for explaining the dual use of budgeting in practice. First, our study exemplifies 
Simons’ ideas: the managers describe an interactive use of budgets. More specifically, two 
practical aspects of budgets used as ICS with more intense relationships up and down the 
line—with their superiors and teams, respectively—and the additional use of subjective 
evaluation criteria for rewarding performance.  
Second, we observed that the budget can be used as an interactive MCS while remaining a 
crucial component of the performance evaluation system (PES). In addition, the field study 
provides insights into work-based arrangements which permit this dual use of budgeting. There 
is evidence of an organisational risk- and effort-sharing arrangement among divisions, which 
some managers called mutualisation. When uncertainty affects one division during the year, 
top management may ask another division to achieve a higher performance. As the top 
management’s primary emphasis is on achieving the overall budget objectives, it develops 
strategies to balance out results in order to do so. Mutualisation entails information sharing and 
the use of budgeting as an ICS. Besides, mutualisation does not jeopardize perception of 
fairness in individual accounting-based performance evaluation. The managers consider it fair 
to reward individuals who have put in more effort to make up for the poor results of other 
markets. Further more, in the long term, advantageous and disadvantageous situations may 
affect individuals evenly. Mutualisation thus makes possible the dual use of budgeting. 
Section 2 reviews the literature and presents our research objectives. Section 3 is devoted to the 
research method, notably data collection based on projective techniques, as well as data 
analysis. Section 4 reports our field results. The final section discusses our findings and 
considers the limitations of the study.  
 
 
  32. Literature background and research focus  
Prior literature reveals conflicting findings regarding use of budgeting in PEU contexts. Since 
Argyris (1952, 1953) and Hopwood (1972), a stream of behavioural empirical literature has 
discussed the roles and use of budgeting in relation to performance evaluation and reliance on 
accounting performance measures (RAPM) under uncertainty conditions, but has failed to 
provide conclusive answers (Section 2.1). We use Simons’ MCS framework  for better 
understanding of the use of budgeting in uncertainty contexts (Section 2.2).  
 
2.1. Budgeting in perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) contexts 
Uncertainty was one of the earliest and most prominent variables examined in early 
contingency research of the 1960s (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). More specifically, PEU has 
been defined as the uncertainty arising out of the external environment of a firm, referring to 
“the unpredictability in the actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory 
groups that comprise the external environment of the business unit” (Govindarajan, 1984, 
p.127). Besides, PEU lies in the managers’ perceptions of uncertainty in their environment
ii 
rather than actual uncertainty. As suggested by Weick (1969), organisational members form an 
image of the environment—he terms a process of enactment—and “respond to the enacted 
environment rather than to the objective environment” (Gordon and Narayan, 1984, p.34). 
 
Much tension appears in the conflicting findings of prior literature regarding the reliance on 
accounting controls and the pressure to meet targets under conditions of perceived uncertainty. 
A stream of literature suggests that uncertainty limits the use of budgeting as a control device, 
based on target-setting and individual accounting-based performance evaluation (Govindarajan, 
1984; Brownell, 1985; Williams, Macintosh and Moore, 1990; Imoisili, 1989). First, 
uncertainty makes target-setting more difficult. As Galbraith stated (1977, p.36): “the basic 
effect of uncertainty is to limit the ability of the organization to preplan or make decisions 
about activities in advance of their execution”. Uncertainty causes difficulty in making 
predictions, which hinders budgetary target-setting (Govindarajan, 1984). Second, uncertainty 
is problematic at the performance evaluation stage as individual managers may be unable to 
achieve their pre-set objectives due to uncontrollable factors. Uncertainty makes it difficult to 
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(dis)advantageous circumstances (Hartmann, 2000). For this reason, uncertainty causes 
difficulties in the implementation of the controllability principle. This common textbook 
principle states that “managers should only be assigned responsibility only for what they can 
control” (Atkinson et al., 1997). Adherence to this principle is considered desirable as it 
indicates that performance evaluation should be “fair” (Merchant, 1987, p.77), while non-
adherence generates dysfunctional behavioural effects, especially a lack of managerial 
motivation. This would suggest that PEU limits the use of budgeting as a control device.  
 
Prior research on this issue has provided contrasting results. Some empirical studies have 
concluded that uncertainty induces lower budget emphasis and the use of subjective elements in 
performance evaluation. For instance, superiors would take managerial efforts into account in 
unfavourable uncertainty contexts (Govindarajan, 1984; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985). 
Govindarajan (1984) found a negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
RAPM; Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) observed the use of subjective dimensions for 
performance evaluation in high PEU business units.  
In contrast, other studies suggest that the use of budgeting as a strict control device is 
reinforced in high PEU contexts. They argue that budgeting is used as a structured framework 
to signal priorities, a reminder of the objectives and a reliable benchmark in a turbulent 
environment. Ezzamel (1990) found that accounting performance measures were used more 
frequently under conditions of high uncertainty, the rationale being that larger, decentralized 
firms would emphasize formal communication means when faced with uncertainty. Ezzamel’s 
results corroborate a number of other studies (Khandwalla, 1972; Merchant, 1981; Simons, 
1987).  
 
Moreover, empirical research regarding the principle of controllability has shown that it is 
rarely implemented in a strict manner (Bushman et al., 1995; Dent, 1987; Drury and El-
Shishini, 2005; Merchant, 1987; Otley, 1990; Vancil, 1979). Theoretical arguments have been 
also provided to support the idea that “perfect” controllability is not desirable (MacNally, 1980; 
Choudury, 1986; Merchant, 1987). Implementing a perfect controllability principle might work 
against organisational effectiveness, and take away a manager’s motivation to exert as much 
  5influence as possible on events. First, Choudhury (1986) suggests that the organisation should 
allow a manager in a situation of failure to rather blame external factors. Internal attribution of 
failure
iii would cause helplessness and self-blame, which could be counter-productive in terms 
of self-efficacy: “It is desirable for the organization to assist the manager in finding external 
attribution for failure caused by non-controllable factors, even if it reduces his perception of 
control, so as to retain his self-efficacy and to avoid dysfunctional consequences of its loss” 
Choudhury (1986, p.192). Second, Merchant (1987) introduces the notion of “uncontrollable 
but relevant factors”: when confronted with PEU they can not control, managers may still be 
able to influence the outcomes, making performance evaluation based on non-controllable 
factors both feasible and desirable. It would provide managers an incentive to exert some 
influence upon the events. Besides, managers tend to regard themselves as “managerial 
entrepreneurs” whose job it is to bear a certain level of risk (Merchant, 1987). 
Furthermore, there is significant evidence of budgets becoming more important to provide 
direction and control under conditions of uncertainty. Some authors (Marginson and Ogden, 
2005(a), 2005(b)) have shown that managers appreciate budgeting in a PEU context as it offers 
some stability and structure—a fixed reference in a fast-changing environment. Reasons 
include that budgeting can play a role as routine and ritual, reducing anxiety at both the 
organisational and individual level.  
In sum, as highlighted by Hartmann (2000), RAPM in PEU contexts is paradoxical: PEU limits 
the “feasibility” of controls due to the limited controllability but increases its “desirability”, i.e., 
need for controls. Therefore, the use of budgeting in high PEU situations deserves further 
attention. As suggested in previous management control literature, tensions are likely to be 
important, as a changing environment calls for fluidity and flexibility, as well as for structure 
and order, in management practice (Dent, 1987). Budgeting, as a formal control device thus 
faces contradictory imperatives and is likely to require adjustments and adaptation.  
 
2.2 Dual use of budgets as diagnostic and interactive control systems  
MCS used according to traditional models of cybernetic organisational control tends to focus 
on compliance to pre-planned objectives and standards (Anthony, 1965). In this case they 
represent a coercive device, which may work as a coercive type of formalisation
iv (Adler and 
Borys, 1996). However, some authors (Dent, 1987; Simons, 1990; Chapman, 1998) have 
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to deal more effectively with inevitable contingencies” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004, p.279). 
Enabling, coercive formalisations are likely to drive very different attitudinal outcomes
v and 
different assessments of “fairness”, i.e. of good and bad MCS (Adler and Borys, 1996, p.62). 
Moreover, a number of these management control studies suggest that in PEU contexts 
management control practices combine coercive and enabling characteristics (Dent, 1987; 
Simons, 1990; Chapman 1998; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). There is a need for better 
understanding of how
vi MCS might be used simultaneously to support and constrain 
operational management. We use Simons’ distinction between interactive and diagnostic MCS 
as a framework to examine this question
vii.  
Simons (2000) suggests that organisations need to rely both on a diagnostic control system 
(DCS) and an interactive control system (ICS). DCS are defined as “formal information 
systems that managers use to monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from 
preset standards of performance” (Simons, 2000, p.209). In contrast, an MCS is labelled 
interactive when: (1) information generated by the MCS forms an important, recurring agenda 
addressed by top management levels; (2) data are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face 
meetings of superiors, subordinates and peers; and (3) the process relies on ongoing discussion 
of underlying data, assumptions and action plans (Simons, 1987; Simons, 1991). 
Budgets can be used as DCS, with variance analysis regarded as a cybernetic feedback system: 
objectives are set and results are monitored; and variances are computed, analysed and used in 
identifying new action plans. When budgets are used as a diagnostic tool, they also serve the 
traditional purpose of evaluating performance and delegating responsibilities to individual 
organisational members. However, budgets may also be used interactively, in which case they 
will be a “dynamic and proactive tool to gather information and stimulate discussions” 
(Simons, 1991, p.61) that facilitates monitoring of the strategic uncertainties of the firm or 
business unit. Simons (1990) has emphasized that budgets are used in an interactive manner, 
describing situations where budgets are the “focus of a good deal of debate among managers 
… They are used as agendas to discuss tactics, new marketing ideas, etc.” (Simons, 1990, 
p.134). In its more sophisticated management use, the budget could activate organisational 
learning and allow new strategies to emerge through inter-hierarchical dialogue (Kloot, 
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viii. Like most interactive MCS, interactive budgets enable the firm to cope better with 
perceived strategic uncertainties. 
Simons has made the following claims: (1) in PEU contexts, one MCS only is used 
interactively, and (2) which MCS depends on the perceived uncertainties and on the industry: 
“profit planning systems [budgets] are used interactively in firms with a desire to compete 
through product and market innovations” (Simons, 1991, p.55); and (3) if the budget is used 
interactively, formula-based incentives may not work, thus there is a need for subjective 
assessment and rewards (Simons, 2000). As a consequence, Simons finds that budgeting may 
have a dual use, which he regards as problematic: “Managers who wish to use a profit plan 
[budget] interactively face a special problem […] How can a profit plan [budget] be used both 
diagnostically and interactively at the same time?” (Simons, 2000, p.225). Contingency 
“buffers” may protect key diagnostic targets in cases when profit plans [budgets] must be used 
both diagnostically and interactively at the same time: “In a highly competitive, innovative 
business, the senior manager might build in a contingency that would hold participants 
accountable for an initial target of $11 million with $1million contingency fund [for a 10 
million “real” target] that could be drawn upon, after mutual agreement”(Simons, 1995, 
p.120-121). Although Simons has contributed to highlighting issues related to the duality of 
budgeting, the question remains rather peripheral to his work. Our study aims at better 
understanding Simons’ claims about the “dual use” of budgeting in PEU contexts. We explore 
more specifically how interactive and diagnostic uses of budgets are simultaneously possible in 
organisations, thus gaining insights into how organisations reconcile the need for flexibility and 
adaptation while maintaining budgetary pressure for performance evaluation. 
 
3. Research design 
In this explorative study, we have sought to clarify how managers experience and cope with 
uncertainty in the budgetary process. We conducted 14 semi-structured interviews with senior 
sales and marketing managers from 13 companies
ix operating in a variety of industries. Our aim 
was to capture the actual budgeting experience of senior sales and marketing managers.  
 
  83.1. A multiple research site field study  
There has been a long-standing case for qualitative, field-based research in management 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Yin, 1984; Bruns and Kaplan, 1987; Scapens, 1990; Miller, 
1996; Ahrens and Dent, 1998). Some budgeting studies (Lukka, 1988; Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1999; Frow et al., 2005) have adopted such an approach. In management accounting, 
most of the explorative field work has been case-based rather than cross-sectional. In marketing 
literature, on the other hand, explorative studies have made extensive use of semi-directive 
interviews with varied interviewees’ profiles (e.g. Aaker, Kumar and Day, 2006). While case 
studies still have a lot to bring to explorative management accounting research, we decided to 
use the multiple sites approach, and conducted interviews with managers in various industries. 
First, multiple research site studies may help researchers to uncover the reasons for conflicting 
results and ambiguities in prior research (Lillis and Mundy, 2003, 2005)
x. Second, comparing 
different research sites, we were able to look for similarities and differences across 
organisations. Similarities helped us gain some external validity, as we could identify patterns. 
For instance, when the same uses of budgeting or the same practices—such as mutualisation—
are found in various industries or companies, such practices gain significance in furthering 
understanding of budgeting complexities. Third, we aimed at building the highest possible level 
of trust with our interviewees (Moorman et al., 1993). No more than one manager from each 
company was interviewed, providing assurance that no organisational use would be made of 
statements made. During the interview, the manager was in a neutral, safe, enclosed space, 
allowing reflection in privacy.   
We only conducted a limited number of interviews (14) compared to those of previous cross-
sectional studies (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Bruns and MacKinnon, 1993). This reflects 
the explorative nature of the study, which aimed for an in-depth analysis of the material to 
capture the complexity of the use of budgeting in PEU situations.  
 
3.2. Sales and marketing interviews 
We conducted interviews with senior sales and marketing managers. Sales and marketing 
departments are exposed to the external environment and—although to varying degrees—to 
rapidly changing and not always easily predictable markets. For example, there is a high degree 
of uncertainty in the sales transformation process when economic uncertainty, regulatory 
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sales output. Therefore, sales and marketing can be considered a field worth capturing 
perceived uncertainty on and its consequences
xi. 
Sales and marketing departments have some specificity. First, historically, sales force managers 
have tended to emphasize reward systems based on the attainment of sales objectives 
(Churchill et al., 1985). Second, the sales budget is the starting point for corporate budgeting. 
Target-setting and the achievement of objectives are all the more important at the sales level as 
an (in)appropriate sales budget cascades down over the rest of the organisation’s budgets—
production, purchasing, investments and so forth. In sum, sales and marketing is a departmental 
area where the pressure to meet budgets is likely to be high. While this degree of specificity 
certainly limits the generalisability of our explorative findings, it also reveals some interesting 
features for better understanding of how managers experience budgeting in PEU contexts. 
We conducted interviews with senior executive sales and marketing managers who were 
relatively homogeneous in terms of nature and level of responsibility. All managers reported to 
a divisional managing director in a business unit. They were in charge of clearly identified, 
measurable budgetary objectives: sales, cost of resources to achieve sales objectives and 
additional longer-term issues related to customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, brand 
awareness and brand perception.  
With our focus on the sales and marketing functions, we sought to cover as much variety as 
possible in terms of industries and distribution channels, in order to capture possible 
differences across industries. The respondents' companies included firms in the sectors of 
environment utilities, beverages, food/tobacco, pharmaceuticals, equipment, 
telecommunications, computers services, transportation, computer equipment, food, packaging, 
and healthcare. All the companies were of significant size, as large firms are more likely to 
have implemented sophisticated, formal budgeting and performance evaluation processes. 
Trust, between the interviewer and the interviewees, has been identified as a significant factor 
in enhancing the quality of interview data (Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpandé, 1993).  Our 
research design therefore relied on interviewees whose level of trust in the interviewers was 
previously high in order to create a favourable relationship for collecting data. Besides, we 
promised entire confidentiality to the interviewees, making clear that no organisational or 
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lasted on average 1½ to 2 hours. 
 
3.3. Data collection 
Our aim was to identify how the managers’ perceptions of uncertainty affect their budgeting 
practices. The exploratory semi-structured interviews enabled us to discuss the managers' 
perceptions and personal experiences in relation to uncertainty, budgeting and performance 
evaluation. Visuals were employed simultaneously with a semi-directive interview protocol, 
the visuals being an additional stimulus for the interviewees. “Creative interviewing allows 
research subjects to express themselves more freely, and thus to have a greater voice in the 
research process” (Fontana and Frey, 1998, p.62). The use of visuals during interviews 
belongs to projective methods, which have long been in use in marketing research (Haire, 
1950; Mason, 1996). A professional illustrator drew the  carefully-designed visuals that 
accompanied our questions in a deliberately elusive style, suggesting a range of situations and 
attitudes. We defined the topics of the visuals for the illustrator based on concepts from the 
budgeting literature (for instance, job tension, budgetary participation etc.). While this 
underlying framework certainly shapes to some extent the interviewees’ answers, the visuals 
encouraged the managers to allude to much broader issues, such as trust or mutualisation. 
Interestingly, interviewees interpreted the visuals differently.  
The early stages of the interview concerned issues of the organisational design, the manager’s 
position in the company, as well as the specificities of the industry and perceived uncertainties. 
Then, four series of visuals were introduced. Each series concerned specific aspects of the 
budgeting cycle, at three different times: target-setting time (two series of visuals, A and B); 
throughout the year, as unexpected events make it difficult to stay “on budget” (Series C); and 
at the end of the year, if the objectives have not been achieved (Series D). Regarding the target-
setting time, Series A was used to better understand how target-setting in uncertainty situations 
was experienced from an individual, cognitive point of view, while Series B focused on the 
social or relational experience included in target-setting.  
When shown the visuals, the managers expressed what they called to mind, relating these 
spontaneous associations to individual organisational experience, sometimes leading to short 
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protocol to allude to dimensions that were not spontaneously addressed by the interviewee.  
Used as an indirect technique for measuring an individual’s underlying motivations, "there is 
sufficient empirical evidence that this [projective] approach to the measurement of attitude 
expression is fruitful and valid." (Weschler and Bernberg, 1950, p.225). In practice, our 
experience of using them in addition to a semi-structured interview protocol confirms that such 
methods encourage the managers to talk about their own motivations (Barth and Rive, 2005). 
Within a time-constrained interview, the visuals helped the managers to focus discourse on 
perceptions and feelings. For example, in order to capture whether openness and information 
sharing are common practices in their organisation, we left them the option through their choice 
of visuals to focus on pictures evoking such practices. In Series C, for instance, some 
interviewees alluded to openness and transparency, some to solidarity, and others to nothing. 
Overall, the managers produced very little “politically correct” discourse. 
To summarize, the semi-structured interviews covered the following topics: the organisational 
and external environmental contexts of operations, the goal-setting and target-setting processes, 
the role of budgetary information in guiding action and decision-making during the year, and 
finally target achievement and performance evaluation.  
 
3.4. Data analysis 
Fully-transcript interviews (18 to 25 single-spaced pages each) provided a rich set of data on 
which we conducted two complementary kinds of analysis. The first type of analysis, 
horizontal analysis, compares the different managers’ perceptions and discourse on categories, 
identifying similarities and specificities across companies. The second type, vertical analysis, 
aims to reconstitute the cause-and-effect relationships in a specific manager’s thinking and 
discourse.  
Horizontal analysis 
Our horizontal analysis begins with the perception of environmental uncertainty (Category 1, 
Table 1), based on the first set of non-directive questions put to the managers. The four series 
of visuals used during the interviews underlie the rest of the horizontal analysis. 
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Series A relates to the manager’s feelings when required to define and negotiate objectives: the 
pictures helped interviewees to reflect on the extent to which they felt possible anxiety, 
boredom or emphasis on target-setting. Based on series A, the categories that we used to code 
the findings are: 
-  Is the target-setting perceived as difficult? Why? What are the effects of PEU on target-
setting? (Category 2a, Table 2) 
-  How formal is the target-setting process? (Category 2b, Table 2) 
-  How much commitment is there to the target-setting process? Does budgeting matter to the 
manager? (Category 3, Table 2) 
 
Insert Series B 
Series B was designed to raise the issues of relations between the manager, top management 
and colleagues at target-setting time. We sought in particular to capture whether any 
collaborative work was involved, and to define the nature of exchanges between the various 
hierarchical levels at that stage. Based on the visuals, the manager would reflect on the 
perception of the nature of work at target-setting time: working alone, in a one-to-one 
relationship with a superior, or collaboratively in a team—with colleagues and/or the boss. 
Many managers then emphasized that the collaborative work for setting the coming year’s 
targets was not limited to target-setting time, but was ongoing throughout the year. Two 
categories are thus based on Series B: 
-  Is target-setting an individual or a collaborative task? (Category 4, Table 2) 
-  Does target-setting result from a one-shot exercise, as limited in time as possible, or is it an 
ongoing activity? (Category 5, Table 2) 
 
Insert Series C 
Series C dealt with what happens during the year, especially when it becomes clear that 
expected results may not be achieved. Building on managers’ reactions to the visuals, we were 
able to explore the approaches adopted when results are lower than expected—for instance, 
when a significant negative variance is observed. The managers saw and described a great 
variety of situations in the visuals, probably a reflection of their different experiences of what 
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categories underlying the design of the visuals: 
- Is information shared with superiors or the team? (Category 6, Table 3) 
- Are the problems addressed individually or collaboratively? (Category 7, Table 3). This 
category can itself be split into two separate components which emerged during the interviews: 
  Does top management actively get involved to find a solution when the situation 
deteriorates, or does it remain aloof, raising the pressure without participating in the 
search for solutions?  
  Can the overall objectives assigned to the division be reallocated to other 
colleagues? In other words, is the manager ever asked to do more during the year 
because other divisions are not performing as well as expected? Does the manager 
ever ask more of certain subordinates because some markets managed by others will 
clearly fall below their objectives? 
 
Insert Series D 
Finally, Series D alluded to various possible year-end situations for a manager who has failed 
to meet the budget. Failure may be likened to entering a tunnel, or a blame game. Alternatively, 
failure may be experienced positively as a learning opportunity, or somebody—such as a 
superior or colleague—may assist. Looking at the visuals, many managers mentioned sanctions 
that apply for non-achievement of the budget, the factors taken into account in performance 
evaluation, the superior’s attitude, the collective versus individual perception of failure. We let 
them elaborate and possibly asked further questions on the categories forming the basis for our 
horizontal analysis: 
-  Do formula-based incentives work? How? (Category 9, Table 4) 
-  Are there any short-term subjective rewards? How do they work? (Category 10, Table 4 ) 
-  Are there any long-term subjective rewards? What does a career depend on? (Category 11, 
Table 4)  
In other words, one of our aims was to understand whether the short-term individual bonus is 
strictly dependent on achievement of the initial budget objectives. We wished to know whether 
a manager who does not achieve the targets set would receive no bonus at all or a partial bonus 
based on qualitative objectives, such as personal development, attitude and efforts. 
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component or not, and whether rewards are partly individual or partly collective. Alternatively, 
reward systems can make individual objective-based bonuses conditional upon achieving 
overall objectives, awarding no individual bonus if the collective target is not met, even if 
individual performance is outstanding. 
Finally, beyond the short-term bonus (the current year), we looked at the impact of the 
manager’s financial results on career in the medium term. Especially, we assessed how much 
consideration is given to qualitative aspects versus the individual’s accounting performance. 
In sum, the horizontal analysis has given us insights into whether, and how, budgeting was 
used both interactively and for performance evaluation. 
 
Vertical analysis 
The vertical analysis of the interviews translates the categories used in the horizontal analysis 
into stories that make sense. It also identifies the relationship between PEU in a given industry 
and certain budgeting practices. For instance, a manager in charge of international 
telecommunications sales covers national markets with high political and economic risks, and, 
therefore, considers that unexpected problems may arise at any time in these markets. 
Consequently, budgeting is used in an interactive manner and action plans are adjusted on an 
ongoing basis. The vertical analysis furthers understanding of “new” categories that emerged in 
the open interviews, such as mutualisation. 
Our vertical analysis was validated by sending out our synopsis of the interview to the 
manager, who was free to validate the associations and interpretations. 
 
4. Results 
We present our results in two sections. Section 4.1 describes the findings of the horizontal 
analysis along the main data analysis categories. Section 4.2 presents the vertical analysis of 
two short cases which we found particularly illustrative of the effects of both perceived 
uncertainty and emerging categories. 
  
4.1. Horizontal analysis 
This part describes what we found across organisations.  
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the distributors’ demands are largely unpredictable. Senior sales managers must turn in the 
following year’s budgets before the beginning of top-level negotiations with very powerful 
distributors (food retail channel). If a negotiation with a major distributor fails, the company 
could lose up to 20% of its sales. Such a risk exists at target-setting and also during the year. 
 “There’s great uncertainty, because we’ve always got to go through this channel … relations are tense, 
like they are whenever you’re dealing with someone more powerful than yourself. If there’s a problem 
during negotiations, they lose 0.1%, in other words nothing, whereas I lose 20% of my sales revenues, 
so there’s no room for discussion at all. The balance of power is completely unequal. 
… Realistically, you have to remember that our approach involves an intermediary channel: the 
distributor. If the product is unavailable (from the distributor), the final customer won’t buy it.” 
(Healthcare) 
 
In the tobacco industry, changes in the legal context - speed and level of anti-tobacco 
regulation and tax developments in the various countries - are a major source of PEU: 
“When the government decides to raise taxes, […], in our line of trade sales may collapse...” (Tobacco, 
Company A)  
 
In geographically-diversified companies, currency fluctuations may be another source of PEU. 
Shifts in currency value can affect pricing decisions and threaten margins.   
To summarize, we found a variety of specific sources of PEU across industries: threats from 
the powerful distribution channels; market volatility and sensitivity to the economic situation 
(for instance, cyclic markets); legal and tax developments affecting products; market 
deregulation and globalisation; competitors’ attitude; and risks associated with new product 
launches. Combined with budgetary pressure, these different sources of uncertainty all make 
the senior sales and marketing managers perceive their environment as highly uncertain.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Second, the findings help us understand better how, as PEU strengthens, managers are affected 
at target-setting time, during the year and at the time of year-end performance assessment.  
 
Target-setting  
Insert Table 2 here  
 
We found several similarities. First, in every single case, PEU, whatever its source, impinges 
upon target-setting. A telecom company provides one example. The manager is in charge of 
different international areas, which have grown in importance. However, some of these areas 
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particularly unpredictable in such countries: they may climb to never-reached levels and grow 
by double-digits, or just collapse if the political situation deteriorates during the year. The lack 
of predictability seriously hampers target-setting: 
“There are unpredictable factors that are beyond our control; for instance, the geopolitical situation in 
Ivory Coast or Congo. It’s a real headache setting objectives for those places!” (Telecommunications) 
 
In most cases, sales targets are also used later as a reference for the sales force’s variable 
compensation. This makes target-setting be perceived as an even more risky and difficult 
exercise: 
“Don’t fool around with target-setting, because 40% of people's salaries are performance-based, so 
they depend on how well you budgeted... If you set them a non-realistic target, there's no motivation. 
And I don't have two figures, one for them, one for my boss... Just one.” (Pharmaceuticals) 
 
Second, the target-setting process is formalized in every case, and usually also very detailed. 
Third, all industry cases but three—Equipment, Computer equipment, and Food—involve 
considerable discussions, commitment, and some form of interaction in the budgeting process. 
The managers describe intense discussions between the different hierarchical levels—above 
and below sales and marketing managers. Instead of arm's-length management, there is 
ongoing interaction all year with teams and/or superiors. The chief executive officer (CEO), the 
managing directors, sales directors, brand managers and product managers, all have daily 
contact with each other, develop information systems to monitor market trends closely and 
decide on strategies following an in-depth collective debate. At target-setting time, the 
managers question both the targets and the underlying economic assumptions, comparing views 
on possible developments in the business environment. The senior sales and marketing 
managers listen carefully to their teams and work closely with them.  
“When I’m working on the budgets with my area managers, we have a proper discussion. I ask them to 
explain why they think one orientation is better than another… in the end we always manage to reach a 
consensus.” (Beverages)  
 
Discussions can include attentive examination of operational strategies and in-field initiatives. 
Throughout the dialogue, the managers try and capture potential environment changes, their 
possible adverse effects and the appropriate responses. For instance, in the pharmaceutical 
industry, sales and marketing campaigns have a direct impact on the level of sales; over time, 
the managers develop an empirical knowledge of what return on investment (ROI) to expect 
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manager seeks to understand the underlying assumptions, so that alternative scenarios can be 
explored and enacted if the assumptions change during the year. 
“Bottom-up budget development is really detailed. Incredibly detailed. I have a sheet listing all the 
campaigns, and I discuss the points one by one. For example, I’ll say to one of my colleagues: I think 
the return on investment has been underestimated for this operation; looking at the last one we did, it 
brought in so many patients, so I think your forecasts are a bit lightweight…” (Pharmaceuticals) 
 
 
Analysing differences across firms also provides insights. First, interaction is in some cases 
limited “up the line” (i.e., by top management), but remains important “down the line” (i.e., by 
teams), and all the more so when top-down financial pressure is intense
xii. Second, we found 
that the managers with the highest PEU are those experiencing the most top-down target-
setting. When top-down pressure is intense, PEU, which corresponds to perceived risk, is 
higher. To reduce PEU, managers need to reinforce interaction with their teams. PEU is 
reduced where interaction is greatest, and remains high when there is little interaction with 
sales teams. This result confirms that PEU is linked to perceived target-related risk rather than 
environmental turbulence. 
Third, the perceived difficulty in target-setting is experienced to varying extents, but there is no 
clear relationship between the level of PEU and the level of difficulty in target-setting. In a top-
down process, the target-setting difficulty increases down the line, when it comes to 
dispatching the overall objective set by top management between the various managers.  
Such findings suggest that senior sales and marketing managers understand that their job is to 
cope with these environmental uncertainties—they perceive them, but consider their existence 
as “normal”; however, the financial pressure increases their perception of the risk (of missing 
targets).  
 
Lower than expected results during the year  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Each case without exception involves openness and information sharing with both superiors 
and teams. However, this information sharing can vary in nature.  
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company has a culture of openness and a team spirit reflected in considerable interaction, 
discussions, and a collective search for solutions, as for example in Company A:  
“It’s an ongoing discussion, we don't wait for the planning exercise to discuss our strategy, what we 
could do, or take corrective action. […] If there is a problem, obviously we won’t try and hide it… we 
try to see how we can solve it, we talk it over […] The search for solutions is shared from the outset…” 
(Tobacco, Company A)  
 
In other cases (Environment, Pharmaceuticals, Computer services, Computer equipment, 
Food), on the contrary, managers comment that it is impossible to hide anything. Once the 
information systems are in place, top management will find out sooner or later, sooner being 
better than later. Here again, two different situations were observed as follows. 
(1) The information is passed on up the line, but top management shows no support. The 
manager’s superiors will be aware of the situation and may consider “mutualising” the risk, 
asking other divisions to step up their efforts in order to achieve the overall objective, but the 
problem remains individual. It is up to the manager, rather than top management, to handle the 
situation and find solutions.  
“Immediately, you would go and see your boss. (…) It was very, very tough, it was kind of “it’s up to 
you to cope”. So you aren’t going to make your targets, OK we’ll lower your budget, the brand isn’t 
doing well. That was more or less the line they took. And then it was up to you to find a way to get 
things going again. He (your boss) was doing OK overall, but he was sending you a message that it was 
your job to find the solution for your brand and although there was plenty of two-way discussion on the 
target-setting process, in this case you were on your own. At first they said, well, it’s not working, well 
that’s it, if you won’t tell us what to do, we’ll get rid of the brand. Fortunately, you do find ideas, you 
come through. But it’s really hard going in such situations.” (Food) 
 
(2) Alternatively, providing superiors with advance information makes it possible to involve 
them
xiii, and take joint responsibility for the choice of solution: 
“Whatever autonomy I may have, I give the hierarchy a degree of visibility and that means they’re 
jointly responsible for what I do…” (Computer services)  
 
The need for information sharing is related to the need to anticipate, but above all to the top 
management’s absolute requirement to achieve overall objectives. In various industries the 
managers mention that targets can be stretched during the year for certain business units if it 
becomes clear that others will not be able to achieve their targets. They talked about 
mutualisation at the corporate level: divisions can be called upon to compensate for other 
divisions’ unsatisfactory performance. The company’s overall budget is a strong commitment 
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can adjust, offset, and change objectives, as long as they achieve that overall budget.  
“What’s important is that the group achieves its overall objectives, and there are readjustments. If one 
entity has had problems with sales, operational management or whatever, we might have to ask the 
others to make an effort to compensate for that… It has been known to happen” (Environment utilities) 
 
Finally, the results show that the practice of forecasts exists almost everywhere, but at 
frequencies that vary (between once and four times a year) and are related to budgetary 
pressure.  Four forecasts were found in companies where budget-related financial pressure is 
greatest. However, in all cases, the original budget remains the benchmark, and forecasts are 
not taken into account for performance assessment. Rather they are used to improve visibility, 
as an incentive for corrective action, so that results will come in as close to budget as possible 
at the end of the year, and to improve the quality of budget forecasts for the following year.  
 
Performance evaluation at year end 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Many companies (10 out of the 12 in our study) include a significant variable portion in sales 
managers’ compensation, ranging from 15% to 40% of their total package, a very large 
proportion of which is based on achievement of individual and collective budget targets. Two 
among them reported the existence of a system where individual bonuses are only awarded on 
the achievement of a collective result - if not, even the highest-performing individuals receive 
no bonus. Overall, budgetary objectives are used for performance evaluation. 
Seven out of the ten companies working with accounting-based incentives balance achievement 
of quantitative targets with more qualitative targets for calculation of the bonus
xiv. This practice 
allows more freedom in performance assessment, depending on the nature of the qualitative 
objectives and the degree of precision in their definition. This means a manager may continue 
to show confidence in a colleague, and possibly provide some reward, even if quantitative 
objectives are not fully achieved. This was the case for one of our interviewees in the 
pharmaceuticals sector: 
“At the end of the year my boss said to me: “97%, well you nearly made it”, and I answered: “Well, I 
did much more than was humanly feasible.” (...) I don't think anyone's fooled. Well, if people feel that 
you didn't achieve your targets because there was some under-optimization in the use of resources or 
knowledge, it’s different... I think it’s easier when they believe the manager is smart, (s)he did his/her 
best...”.  (Pharmaceuticals) 
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In sum, in PEU situations, in the ten companies using accounting-based incentives, a high level 
of budget emphasis is indicated. However, in seven out of these, such formula-based incentives 
co-exist with short-term subjective rewards. Besides, career development in the long term 
depends not primarily on accounting performance and is also counterbalanced by other criteria; 
in ten (out of the initial twelve) companies, managers with average accounting results but 
positive behavioural assessment can make career progress.  
Finally, some managers insisted that the budget game is played over several years, and that 
credibility and trust strongly intervene in the process: 
“You know why credibility comes into the process. If you've done well in the past 2 or 3 years ... The 
first slide I show my boss says: “Look, last year I said I would make that much. I made it, sales and 
costs”. You do what you say and you say what you do. So after a while they really trust you and if they 
say: “We need 5 million more in sales”, you answer: “OK, but I need this many more resources to 
make it. Here are the steps we need to take”. Product managers can have enormous power here.” 
(Pharmaceuticals) 
 
Budgeting is experienced as a multiple-year game, not a one-time experience: what has 
happened in previous years, the level of trust built up, and the achievement or non-achievement 
of targets all impact the process as it repeats itself. 
 
In sum, sources of PEU vary. However, PEU across all companies leads to difficulties and 
affects the process of accountability associated with target-setting and year-end performance 
evaluation. Vertical analysis of two cases can help better understand the sales senior manager’s 
experience when PEU is high and the budget is used both as an interactive MCS and 
diagnostically for performance evaluation. 
 
 4.2. Vertical analysis 
This section discusses budgeting use in two company cases which highlight work-based 
arrangements that make complex use of budgeting possible. The two cases selected were those 
where the effects of PEU on the budgeting process seemed the strongest and most clearly 
articulated, furthering our understanding of what happens in such situations.  
Company A 
Company A operates in the tobacco sector and has a 12% share of the European market. The 
manager interviewed was senior manager for European sales, reporting directly to general 
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for Eastern Europe, one for Western Europe and one for the German market.  
The tobacco industry strongly depends on and is very negatively affected by anti-tobacco 
regulations. On average, taxes represent 76% of tobacco consumer’s sale prices in Europe. Tax 
increases, when implemented according to the regulator’s will, are important and significant 
enough to cause a drop in consumption, especially by young people whose budgets are not 
elastic. This causes tobacco sales volume to plummet. Tobacco manufacturers can not lower 
the selling price to compensate for the tax increase as while this would enable them to maintain 
their sales volume, their profit margin would drop.  
 “When the government decides to raise taxes, this can have a major impact on profitability and 
consumer prices. That’s the major factor, it causes great disruption, and in our line of trade sales may 
collapse. Since we try to preserve our margins, we have to increase prices sharply if there’s a big rise in 
taxes, and that can have a long-term impact on the profitability level in our market.” 
 
Target-setting is part of a clearly-organised budget procedure based on a three-year rolling plan 
and development of scenarios. Thus, there are scheduled formal meetings for market managers 
to present their budgets for the coming year. However, the senior sales manager is in 
continuous contact with the sales team, often travelling to the various countries; the area 
managers tell the senior sales manager about their difficulties, and together they discuss action 
plans. This means the senior sales manager knows the figures well before budgeting time. 
 “There's been a lot of discussion and talking before we get to this point, I mean, much earlier than 
budgeting and setting the targets. When we talk about developing markets, it’s an ongoing discussion, 
we don't wait for the planning exercise to discuss our strategy, what we could do, or take corrective 
action: what should we do about distribution, marketing, advertising, etc. It’s a more or less continuous 
dialogue. We don't wait until the formal exercise to discuss the issues… I regularly go round all the 
markets, so while I’m there we can talk about the quantitative objectives, but also action plans to 
implement…” 
 
The previous year, general management had not accepted the figures proposed by the Senior 
Sales Manager, and required him to raise the targets. In such circumstances, the objectives 
imposed on sales management—in terms of sales and contribution—are perceived as difficult 
to achieve. The company is a privatised former national business, which merged with another 
European firm in the tobacco industry not long after privatisation. The group has been under 
pressure from the financial markets ever since to keep its earnings promises. In our 
interviewee’s opinion, this explained the increased pressure. Previously, the emphasis used to 
be on a more long-term approach. 
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overambitious targets, but we still have to meet them, so the pressure is really full-on…” 
 
Forecasts are issued three times a year: in February, May and September. The second forecast, 
in May (R2), is crucial. It provides a more realistic prediction of the year’s performance. 
Budgetary pressure results in slightly unrealistic target figures, and through this second 
forecast, the company has a more accurate view of the year’s forthcoming results. 
When the senior sales manager is faced with unfavourable budget variances, talks are held with 
the sales team. There is extensive information-sharing and solutions are developed collectively. 
“If there is a problem, obviously we won’t try and hide it… we try to see how we can solve it, we talk it 
over… For example, this year, we knew from the start that we’d have difficulty meeting our budget 
objectives. Well before R2, I told them all “see where we can cut back on sales and marketing 
investments, then we’ll decide on the basis of the new forecasts we develop in May.” So before R2, we’d 
already worked on possible change scenarios. We knew that to make our target contribution, we’d need 
to stop investment in such and such a country, or cutbacks on such and such development expenses. The 
search for solutions is shared from the outset…” 
 
A mutualisation process of risk- and effort-sharing may come into play during the year. For 
company A, this takes the form of asking a manager to do more to make up for problems in a 
different zone: 
“When we’re working on R2, they might say: “your colleague has done so well that the pressure’s off 
you a bit” or, on the other hand, “the pressure’s still on, or doubled, because your colleague’s doing 
even worse”. In that case, we need to review our action plans for example, make cuts in the marketing 
budget”. 
 
Nevertheless, the managers’ performance evaluation and bonus is based on the budget figures. 
A large portion of their variable compensation depends on achievement of their individual 
objectives. The compensation system includes bonuses that can represent up to 25% of a 
manager’s total income—10% based on the company’s overall performance, 30% based on 
achievement of the division’s objectives and 60% based on the achievement of individual 
objectives (half qualitative and half budgetary objectives). 
If a manager does not achieve the budget objectives, there is a financial sanction, however, if 
the superior considers that the manager did the best possible, this would qualify for a partial 
bonus. In fact, 40% of the bonus depends on achievement of collective objectives. 
“There is a financial sanction, because a large portion of our variable income is based on objectives: 
some of the bonus relates to objectives that are overall objectives for the entire division. I share 
performance with my colleagues (the managers of other world regional areas). We stand together, 
that’s what I was saying earlier, if one hasn’t made his targets, there’ll be another one who’s done 
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profitability objectives. That’s very clear, and unfortunately, if you don’t meet them, you don’t get that 
bonus. But alongside that are subjective rewards, we don’t only work on financial objectives.” 
 
The case of company A illustrates how the budget is used as a device for interactive control, at 
the heart of permanent exchanges and collaborative solutions. However, the budget also 
remains a central part of the performance evaluation system. It is vital for the company to 
achieve the results promised to the financial markets, and much, therefore, remains at stake on 
the budget. This dual use of the budget is made possible by the risk- and effort-sharing 
described by our interviewee: during the year, certain managers will be asked to make an extra 
effort to compensate for others’ difficulties, particularly when certain markets are suffering the 





Company B operates in the long-distance telecommunications sector. The manager interviewed 
is the senior sales manager for a zone covering most of Europe, Africa and the Middle East, 
reporting directly to the CEO and supervising ten sales managers in charge of various zones. 
The two difficulties encountered by our interviewee relate to economic and political factors. 
Economically, the market is operating at overcapacity, and the price of one minute’s 
telecommunication fluctuates daily. Like most large operators, company B has developed 
infrastructures to sell capacity. Due to excess capacity, a price war exists. In addition, certain 
failing United States (US) operators are offering rock bottom prices under Chapter 11 
bankruptcy rules. Thus, competition is fierce. 
Politically, African countries are markets at potential risk of sudden upheaval. Therefore, great 
uncertainty reigns in certain African markets.  
 “... There are unpredictable factors beyond our control, and Africa in particular is a good source of 
turnover for us, but what we can’t control is the political and geopolitical situation in those regions, so 
there are people saying, yes, the objectives set for Ivory Coast before things started moving, well it’s 
obvious the sales guy who got those is going to have trouble achieving them.” 
 
The sales department is under great budgetary pressure. Sales must be increased by capturing 
other operators’ international traffic, while simultaneously reducing the cost of delivery. In 
particular, company B is expected to participate in its parent company’s debt reduction drive. 
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committee sets the overall goals, which are then redistributed between the entities. Our 
interviewee sees them as very difficult to reach, and, more importantly, not at all open to 
negotiation—incurring greater pressure on objectives. 
“[Given the very ambitious objective announced on the markets], we are affected. That explains the 
pressure we’re under. We have to report our figures practically on a daily basis now. 
To begin with, the executive committee defines the overall sales goals at international level, then that’s 
reallocated between the various entities … I know from experience […] that there’s no point trying to 
challenge the objectives. It won’t make any difference, no difference at all.” 
 
Besides, at each level, there is always someone who will add a bit extra to the objectives. The 
system of inserting “downward safety margins” makes targets difficult for sales staff to 
achieve. Our interviewee has to take on the assigned objectives and allocate them to the 
country managers. If the target is lowered for one, the target for another must be raised. In 
company B, a mutualisation process thus takes place at target-setting time. 
“There’s always someone who’ll add a bit extra [...] So, well, when you finally get down to the actual 
salespeople, the situation is the same whatever the company: it’s unachievable. [..] I’m assigned overall 
objectives [..] Then I have to allocate them between areas, so […] I look at last year’s results and try to 
apply a three-step rule, saying right, we’ll take into consideration what we did last year, the objectives 
imposed from the top, and I’ll apply a growth rate to the sales.” 
 
Our interviewee explained that allocation of the management’s objectives can be adjusted if it 
is known that a given country is in particular difficulty, such as Ivory Coast. Discussion of 
objectives by the sales division can last several weeks. 
“Allocating the objectives is a real headache with all those figures. Sometimes, especially when there 
are compelling reasons, I take part [of the sales objectives] off Africa and pass it on to our man for the 
Middle East, when he’s told me ‘OK, I can make that’. […] Distribution of objectives is always a hard 
time of year, it takes a month if not two. Even when the year has begun, we’re still talking about it.” 
 
There are no mid-year forecasts, but performance monitoring is highly-developed. Our 
interviewee monitors quarterly and half-yearly trend indicators on a weekly basis, for each 
zone, taking into consideration developments for what he calls “the heavyweights” (20% of 
clients, accounting for 80% of sales). Every week, any variance from budget must be reported 
up line.  
“Every week, the boss and I examine progress for all my zones, and this shows up either a general 
problem that might be associated with a given product, or a general opportunity that might be 
associated with an operation or a new product. I have to do a forecast for the year but it fluctuates, 
there are changes, there are unexpected developments, in fact coping with unexpected developments is 
what we do all the time…” 
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regularly and at various levels, from general management to country managers, who seek to 
update their information based on reports from in-the-field contacts. These meetings provide 
our interviewee the latest information available on clients, competition and opportunities that 
may arise during the year. 
“[Whenever a] country is important, I’ll spend an hour and a half going over it, saying ‘what are you 
going to do, what’s your strategy in respect of us ? How are you working with other operators? What 
can we do? Are there any development opportunities? Are there any risks at this or that level?” 
 
Although these ongoing discussions make no formal difference to the budget, they provide 
various levels of the company’s top management a constant up-to-date view of the markets, 
enabling them to monitor and anticipate performance. 
Company B’s sales teams’ compensation includes a large variable bonus of approximately 
40%. When objectives turn out to be as difficult to achieve as the teams feared at the start of 
the year, the senior sales manager has some room for manoeuvre on the variable compensation. 
“I do have some room for manoeuvre on pay: in our company, the variable portion of salary is 40% of 
the total. That’s a lot, but in fact that 40% is split 70/30. […]  30% on qualitative factors.  So as a last 
resort, I can adjust things through the qualitative side, for instance in September….” 
 
The case of Company B again illustrates how budgeting is used for interactive control. There 
are frequent discussions up and down the line. At target-setting time, the senior sales manager 
works closely with the country managers to define their targets. Results are subsequently 
monitored in real time throughout the year. By using the budget in interactive mode, the 
company teams can face uncertain markets collaboratively. For in addition to intense 
competition, there is uncertainty over political developments in some countries. Interactive use 
of the budget facilitates circulation of information, and sharpens the company’s responsiveness. 
At performance evaluation time, the senior sales manager can take into consideration the effort 
put in by certain colleagues, and award them a partial bonus even if they have been unable to 
achieve their targets. These two observations—use of the budgeting as a support for permanent 
dialogue, and implementation of a certain degree of subjectivity at performance evaluation 
time—show that budgeting is used as an interactive MCS. 
However, achievement of targets remains a central element of performance evaluation. It is 
vital for the company to achieve the results promised to the financial markets. Much, therefore, 
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target achievement. The budget comprises features of a diagnostic MCS. 
We thus observe a dual use of the budget—interactive and diagnostic—made possible through 
a  mutualisation process. At target-setting time, some managers asked to do more, to 
compensate for those in charge of problem zones. At the year-end, the variable compensation 
associated with qualitative criteria can be used to reward commitment and team effort. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Based on the findings of the above horizontal and vertical analyses, this study makes three 
major contributions on issues raised by budgeting in PEU situations.  
 
First, we contribute to better understanding of the interrelationships between PEU, budgetary 
pressure and interactive MCS. We find that senior managers perceiving strong top-down 
financial pressure also perceive the highest uncertainty. PEU relates to a perceived risk: (1) 
external events which are likely to endanger achievement of their budgetary objectives; and (2) 
the company’s overall results promised to shareholders
xv. However, we also find that a more 
interactive, collective and ongoing target-setting process reduces the perception of uncertainty 
by the managers: discussion of targets with top management and interaction with colleagues 
and teams as to how to achieve the targets influences their perception of risk.  
 
Second, our study confirms certain findings in the prior literature, especially the interactive use 
of budgeting in PEU situations, including the use of subjective components in performance 
evaluation. The managers describe an ongoing exchange and discussion process at all 
organisational levels—senior sales and marketing managers, their CEO and sales teams—rather 
than a one-off contract: such discussions help managers cope better with strategic uncertainties. 
The budget process includes formal dates for target-setting, interim reviews and year-end 
evaluation of final results. Alongside these scheduled encounters, sales and marketing teams 
have on-going relationships, and information on environmental changes is shared on an on-
going basis. Such openness and information fluidity are useful in the continuous process of 
collective risk-assessment, and the construction of alternative action plans to cope with 
unexpected events.  
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performance evaluation. Some managers mentioned that short-term variable compensation—
i.e., bonuses—may be based on a more subjective, more qualitative system alongside the 
budgetary control system. This subjective performance evaluation is made possible by the close 
relationships described above. Managers’ efforts can be taken into consideration, instead of 
tying rewards solely to budget results (Simons, 1995). In all cases, long-term career 
development is based on informal assessment rather than on pure achievement of yearly 
objectives. Our findings confirm those of previous studies which show how uncertainty leads to 
more subjectivity in performance evaluation. This subjectivity allows top management to take 
into account a manager’s effort, particularly when results have been affected by unfavourable 
uncontrollable factors (Govindarajan, 1984; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985).  
 
However, our findings show that, while subjective elements are integrated in performance 
assessment, budgets are simultaneously used as motivational devices and also play a major role 
in assessment of individual performance. The managers’ compensation systems are based 
partly on qualitative—i.e., subjective—criteria, and partly on accounting performance 
measures
xvi. 
Consequently, we found situations in which the budget is used both as an interactive tool for 
reducing strategic uncertainties, and as a short-term performance evaluation device.  
 
Our third and main contribution is to identify work-based arrangements that allow for this dual 
use of budgeting in practice. More specifically, in PEU situations, we found risk- and effort-
sharing arrangements, which the managers named “mutualisation”: ten out of twelve 
companies in our study used some type of collaborative management of risk and uncertainty—
whether at target-setting time, during the year or at end-of-year performance evaluation and 
reward. Firstly, at target-setting time, collaborative work goes beyond allocating objectives in a 
traditional manner, based on the superior-subordinate relationship: the senior sales and 
marketing manager informs the teams about the top-down global objective, but then objectives 
are allocated interactively and collaboratively. Such a collective process, based on teamwork 
with much interaction between pairs, also outplays traditional budgetary participation, framed 
in the superior-subordinate relationship. Secondly, during the year, mutualisation may occur 
  28when the results are endangered in one specific area, some managers being asked to raise their 
results to compensate for the failing markets. This involves some interactivity and common 
understanding of the business goals by pair managers reporting to the same level. Thirdly, at 
year-end performance evaluation, bonuses may be conditional upon collective objectives. Extra 
individual efforts to rescue the collective objective are acknowledged and rewarded. 
Mutualisation lays on a shared understanding of group objectives and a sense of collective 
achievement that goes beyond the use of contingency funds as described by Simons (1995, 
p.120-121): (1) Simons suggests setting individual higher targets –which might then be drawn 
upon- in order to make sure that the overall desired numbers are made; and (2) a contingency is 
added in the “vertical”, traditional, target-setting. The collective effort-sharing between pairs to 
rescue the overall objective is not described.  
 
Mutualisation allows managers to achieve the overall, group objectives and simultaneously 
preserves perception of fairness in performance evaluation.  
Well before any target-setting process starts, the company’s overall objectives have already 
been “promised” to the financial markets, and, therefore, must be delivered. Most managers 
understand these objectives, and accept that their individual contribution will be measured in 
accounting terms and used for short-term performance evaluation, despite the increased PEU. 
This concurs with the literature, which finds emphasis on the responsibility of managers to 
understand their operating environment and to reduce uncertainty (Merchant, 1987). However, 
as perceived uncertainty increases, due to external turbulences or to increased top down 
pressure, there might be a point when the managers’ perceptions of fairness are endangered. 
During the year, as uncontrollable events threaten a specific manager’s results, effort-sharing 
can save the collective financial objectives. The divisions or managers who successfully 
stretched their budgets to make-up for other markets’ poor performance fairly deserve a reward 
in the short term. Such a mechanism both preserves the collective, global objectives and 
managerial motivation. Mutualisation, as a work-based arrangement, allows the use of 
budgeting because this formal device is not resented as a “bad” rule (Adler and Borys, 1996, 
p.66).  
Mutualisation relieves the pressure of the risk of failing and preserves perceptions of fairness 
with two mechanisms. First, rewards may be partly collective, or conditional upon the 
  29achievement of collective objectives. Besides, individual managers understand that they may 
benefit from the effort-sharing mechanisms in turn, as advantageous and disadvantageous 
situations on the markets do not repeat with the same managers over time. Mutualisation is 
based on expectation of multi-budgeting processes over the years.  
Second, mutualisation relies on mechanisms of mutual trust and reputation. As such, it has 
some similarities with the concept of “mutual trust and accountability…which basically meant 
that a manager could be trusted to “deliver on his part of the bargain” (Marginson, 1999, 
p.223). However, in contrast to Marginson’s study,
xvii mutualisation occurred in our cases 
among autonomous sales units and teams.  They are not interdependent in achieving their 
individual results, but might face turbulence on their individual markets and need to achieve a 
collective objective set by top management
xviii. Our cases depict situations where relying on the 
formal organisation to set individual targets is possible and yet the achievement of overall 
objectives in conditions of uncertainty calls for collective, group-based systems and 
mutualisation of risk. 
To summarize, our findings, in line with those of Simons (1990, 1991, 1994, 1995), show that 
in high PEU situations, a more flexible use of budgeting takes place, based on the collaborative 
search of solutions and the introduction of some subjectivity in performance evaluation. 
However, as we also found, the budget remains a major performance evaluation device in the 
short term. As the overall sales objectives are an imperative commitment to shareholders, to be 
respected under any circumstances, a mutualisation process allows the dual use of budgeting 
which reconciles the conflicting needs of flexibility and strict achievement of corporate 
objectives.  
 
Of course, this study has its limitations. First, from the relatively small number of interviews, 
our findings can not be generalised. Some replication, defined as “finding significant sameness 
from a series of related studies” (Lindsay, 1995, p.36), will be needed in the future. Survey-
based research could test some of the explorative results from our horizontal analysis.  
Second, the study has been conducted in the specific setting of sales and marketing, which 
further limits the generalisability of our explorative findings. As we mentioned, sales and 
marketing are likely to be subject to high budgetary pressure. Moreover, in the light of our 
findings, PEU is related to top-down financial pressure. Across different industries and sales 
  30organisations, mutualisation has emerged as a way of coping with PEU and making dual use of 
budgeting possible. More studies are needed to investigate whether such a process is common 
in other organisational areas. 
A third limitation of this study, which opens up new avenues for future research, is the absence 
of any cultural analysis of the results. Previous research has indicated that performance 
evaluation and compensation packages may differ across countries (Coates, Davis and Stacey, 
1995; Merchant, Chow and Wu, 1995). More generally, our findings belong to a particular 
ethnographic context, which could be re-interpreted as cultural phenomena: for instance, for 
mutualisation, “collective” budgeting may relate to a less individualistic culture than in the 
United Kindgom or US (d’Iribarne, 1989). Replication in different national settings could help 
validate our findings or, conversely, highlight cultural bias.  
Fourth, findings from the PEU analysis identified varied sources of uncertainty across 
industries. However, we were not able at this stage to identify major differences in the 
budgeting process that could relate to these varied sources. More research could help us better 
understand how different sources of uncertainty may impinge on the use of budgeting. 
 
Furthermore, the study calls for a new budgeting agenda. First, the results confirm that more 
research is needed on the many conflicting purposes of budgeting (Samuelson, 1986). Hansen 
and Van der Stede (2004) identify four “reasons-to-budget”: (1) operational planning, (2) 
performance evaluation, (3) communication of goals and (4) strategy formation. Behavioural 
budgeting research focuses on budgeting as a contract for individual performance evaluation 
that should reduce opportunistic behaviour in the firm due to budget-based rewards. This 
perspective tends to neglect certain other purposes of budgeting. The results of our study 
describe how budgets can be used simultaneously as a behavioural device and as a coordination 
instrument. In PEU contexts, management is concerned not only with preventing opportunistic 
behaviour, but also developing collective responses to the expectations of both financial 
markets and customers. Budgets are used for challenging assumptions and action plans, in an 
interactive mode. A parallel mutualisation process helps maintaining simultaneously the 
pressure for individual performance and the management of collective results. Our study has 
contributed to highlighting a work-based arrangement which makes the dual use of budgeting 
  31possible in practice. More research should be conducted to examine how budgets can fulfil 
their different and potentially conflicting purposes. 
Second, arrangements embedded in budgets, especially collective risk- and effort-sharing 
arrangements, also call for more research and theories. There is still much to understand about 
how budgeting develops in risky, uncertain settings, and about the nature of PEU. Some 
arguments have emerged that organisational participants socially construct risk (Collier and 
Berry, 2002). More research is needed into how managers perceive and manage risk in the 
budgeting process. In PEU situations, budgets are caught between individual-level 
accountability and collective, shared accountabilities (Frow et al., 2005). We need further 
insights into how budgetary emphasis can be maintained at the corporate level while 
simultaneously allowing some flexibility in individual targets. Research may be conducted on 
how individual performance-based rewards conflict in theory and practice with corporate-based 
or team-based incentives, as well as profit-sharing plans. Work-based arrangements such as 
mutualisation reopen a long-standing debate on management control over the individual and 
collective levels.  
Third, this study calls for further research on intra-organisational trust embedded in budgeting, 
as well as for taking into account the long-term dimension of budgeting. Target-setting, 
implementation and adjustments during the year and year-end performance evaluation are 
inseparable. Failure to take into account the fact that budget games and goal-setting in a given 
year are largely influenced by what occurred in previous years is perhaps one serious limitation 
of many previous budgeting studies, with some exceptions (Webb, 2002; Fischer et al., 2006). 
A few empirical studies have examined the effects of intra-organisational trust and reputation 
on budgeting
xix (Ross, 1994; Lau and Tan, 2006) but do not provide a significant body of 
knowledge yet. Besides, additional theories of management accounting have emerged 
emphasizing the importance of trust and reputation as a means of management control, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty (Marginson, 1999; Speklé, 2001).  Such theories 
could be fruitfully applied to budgeting processes for further research. Specifically, more 
qualitative longitudinal research could be undertaken to explore the mechanisms of intra-
organisational trust and reputation building in budgeting.  
 
  32Our study opens up ways to advance understanding of budget use in PEU situations. More 
research and theories are needed on these issues at a time when most companies are engaged in 
a quest for more balanced, non-accounting, evaluative styles and are reviewing their budget and 
compensation practices, looking for more flexible and reactive targets.  
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i Which MCS will be used interactively will depend on the perceived uncertainties and strategy. 
iiAs such, the PEU concept used in this paper also bears many similarities with Simons’ “strategic 
uncertainties”, contingencies or threats about the environment as perceived by top management.  
iiiDefined as the manager’s inability to influence outcome when other managers are doing so successfully. 
iv Defined as the extent of written rules, procedures and instructions (Adler and Borys, 1996) 
v Such ideas echo the recent criticisms of budgeting in the managerial world beyond budgeting literature 
(Hope and Fraser, 2000, 2003). Budgets, originally introduced to promote autonomy of decision rights in a 
decentralized context (Vancil, 1979) have turned into coercive bureaucratic instruments of a “compliance, 
command and control” culture. 
vi Some rationales can be found in Marginson and Ogden (2005). Our study focuses on the hows rather than 
the whys. 
vii We do not address the boundaries and beliefs systems suggested by Simons’ (1995) framework. First, 
among his four levers of control, Simons explicitly defines the interactive control systems (ICS) as the 
systems used by top management for coping with strategic uncertainties. As the focus of the paper is on the 
use of a management control system in perceived uncertainty conditions, ICS seem to be the most relevant 
systems in relation to our study. Second, budgets and profit plans are presented by Simons as “typical” 
diagnostic MCS. We understand in Simons (1995) that belief and boundary systems, as opposed to ICS and 
DCS, do not relate directly to formal management control systems, but instead constitute value systems and 
bureaucratic rules and procedures in which the control tools such as budgets and performance measurement 
and management systems (PMMS) are embedded. Certainly the organizational values and constraints 
which define the belief and boundary systems permeate formal MCS such as a budget. However, they are 
not the main object of this study, which explores individual managers’ responses and dual use of formal 
MCS. 
viii A role generally devolved to distinct and more recent MCS, including performance measurement 
systems (PMS) like the balanced scorecard (BSC). 
ix In one company, we interviewed two managers, one senior sales and one senior marketing manager. 
However, we decided not to do that again for anonymity, as mentioned below. Besides, we also removed 
one company from our sample because the interview had not been properly taped, which left us with 13 
interviews in 12 companies.  
x Although the cross-sectional studies approach is less well-documented and less common than case-study 
methods in explorative accounting and control research, it has been successfully used to explore important 
constructs (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Bruns and MacKinnon, 1993; Abernethy and Lillis, 1995). 
xi Brownell (1985) considered marketing departments as low uncertainty departments, as compared to 
research and development (R&D). Although goal ambiguity is certainly more limited for sales and 
marketing managers than R&D managers, in our view sales and marketing managers have to cope directly 
with environmental changes and the corresponding PEU. 
xii Perception bias on the part of managers is also possible: they tend to see themselves as taking a more 
interactive approach with their teams than their superiors with them. For the reasons stated in Section 3.3, 
we did not interview their teams. 
xiii As stated previously (Table 2); team effort and collaborative work is always perceived to be greater 
down the line (with the manager’s own teams) than up the line with superiors: we interpret this fact both as 
a result of the position of senior sales and marketing managers, who are caught “between the hammer and 
the anvil” (as a link in the management chain), but also partially as perception bias. 
xiv Two exceptions (Computer services and Computer equipment) are companies with a very strong “results 
culture”: these are the companies with the largest variable portion of compensation (up to 40%), and where 
long-term career development also depends on results. However, these two companies have distinct target-
setting profiles: while one is quite collaborative and interactive in its target-setting with average PEU, the 
other has high PEU, high top-down financial pressure, and a very low-interaction target-setting process. 
xv Although our study is based on a very different epistemological framework, this finding is in line with 
recent critical literature examining the effects of executives speaking on behalf of the investor within the 
business (Roberts et al., 2006; Ezzamel et al., 2008).   35
                                                                                                                                                 
xvi Our findings are in line with economics theories emphasizing the emergence of hybrid forms of 
governance when “in conditions of substantial uncertainty, the minimum level of contracting detail cannot 
always be provided” (Speklé, 2001, p.422). 
xvii In addition, the managers in our study described situations with accounting-based bonus incentive 
schemes whereas, at Telco, managers either individually or collectively were not explicitly rewarded for 
achieving or exceeding budgetary targets (Marginson, 1999)  
xviii In Marginson’s study, at Telco, the managers described complex matrix organizations where 
interdependencies and transversal processes would hinder decentralization. Marginson identified the 
phenomena of mutual accountability with individuals often being accountable to people from different 
hierarchical levels and different business unit areas (and sometimes beyond). These mutual 
interdependencies cause managers to promote “a collective, a system of social control to help ensure that 
each individual did his bit” (Marginson, 1999, p.217)  
xix : For instance, Ross (1994) suggests that, given a high level of intra-organisational trust, the use of 
accounting-style performance evaluation results in lower dysfunctional effects, i.e. lower job-related 
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Series B: Target-setting time (categories 4 & 5, table 2) 












Series C: During the year (categories 6 & 7, table 3) 








Series D: Year-end performance evaluation (categories 9, 10 & 11, table 4)
  
 
 Environment  utilities            Beverages Food/Tobacco Pharmaceuticals Equipment Telecom
1. Is any EU perceived? 
Nature and source? 
 
YES,  PEU.  
Perception of uncertainty 
on markets is average. 
However, there is strong 
financial pressure related to 
promises to financial 
markets, and difficult-to-
attain top-down objectives. 
 
 
LOW PEU in the short 
term  
due to strong brand 
positioning,  
BUT HIGH PEU in the 
long term as regards 
changes in distribution, 
regulations and taxes 
penalising alcohol 
consumption. Growth in 
exports helps to deal with 
this uncertainty, but creates 
another source of 




YES, HIGH PEU.  
A stable, mature market, 
but uncertainties over 
legislation and taxation; 
very high competitive 
intensity. 
Moreover, shareholders are 
gaining in influence, 
resulting in greater 




YES, PEU.  
The markets are 
manageable with good 
knowledge of the process; 
uncertainty concerns the 
resources competitors will 
use (response options are 
limited, because 
campaigns have to be 
prepared well in advance), 
and new product launches 




HIGH PEU  
in the medium term, related 
to increasing globalisation 
in the domestic market; this 
is a very high-growth 
sector, with fierce 
competition on price 
(leading to profitability 
problems). Small number of 
customers and small 
number of contracts every 




HIGH PEU  
The sector had hardly got 
over the “shock” of 
deregulation when a fierce 
price war ensued between 
several operators (which 
are simultaneously 
customers, suppliers, 
partners and competitors). 
Major investments, excess 
capacity, and financial 




  Computer services  Transportation  Computer equipment  Food  Packaging  Healthcare 
 
1. Is any EU perceived? 
Nature and source? 
 
YES,  PEU.  
The company is a new 
arrival against highly 
structured competition, but 
very good knowledge of its 
banking customers. Highly 
cyclic market (but 




HIGH PEU.  
The sector is very sensitive 
to events and economic 
climate. The market is 
experiencing high growth 
with an enormous amount 
of opportunities, the 
difficulty is identifying them 





HIGH PEU.  
Uncertainty is perceived as 
high due to fierce 




HIGH PEU.  
Fresh dairy products are a 
very competitive market; 
the food channel 
distribution is tough; the 
company has a market 
leader position but there is 
low brand loyalty, impulse 
buys by consumers, and 
relations with distributors 




YES, PEU.  
Uncertainties largely 
resulting from a complex 
structure: “internal” sales 
take place to other 
countries’ sales 
subsidiaries, and these 
subsidiaries are in fact also 
shareholders! The 
European Marketing/Sales 
department has little power 
although profit is measured 
at its level. The situation 
varies greatly according to 
the country.  
The key factor in restoring 
profitability is the final sale 
price to the distributor, 




Major power conflicts with 
distribution, and serious 
power imbalance, which 
are perceived as high 
uncertainty “like the sword 
of Damocles”. 
Moreover, governance is 
also a source of uncertainty 
(but also autonomy!): the 
position is that of a joint 





Table 1: Perceptions of Environmental Uncertainty 
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              Environment  utilities Beverages Food/Tobacco Pharmaceuticals Equipment Telecom
2.a. Is target-setting 
perceived as difficult? 
YES.  
Top-down process; 
difficulty increases as you 
go down the line 
NO.  
Mature market; target-
setting is perceived as quite 
easy 
NO.  
Good control over the 
process. The 3-year plan 
(not the budget) takes into 
account the breakthroughs 
and major changes. 
 
YES.  




New target-setting process. 
The accountability principle 
is new, people are still 
learning. 
YES, perceived as VERY 
DIFFICULT.  
A “nightmare” due to 
political instability in some 
foreign countries. High 
pressure on budgets, very 




2.b. Degree of 





Very detailed process 
STRONG.  
Scientific process based on 
large amounts of data on 
the competition 
STRONG.  
A “marketing power house” 
process requiring much 
financial input. 
STRONG  
Top-down process.   
An “engineering culture” 
with a very rational and 
“scientific” approach to 
budgeting 
STRONG  
Objective contracts are 




  Computer services  Transportation  Computer equipment  Food  Packaging  Healthcare 
2.a. Is target-setting 
perceived as difficult? 
NO.  




  MEDIUM.  
Difficulty in dispatching the 
overall objective set by top 
management between the 
various managers. 
VARIABLE.  
Target-setting is a long 
process. It is perceived as a 
random exercise at the 
beginning of the process, 
but not at the end. Marketing 
and sales have a strong 
voice. 
YES.  
Sales objectives are set at 
an international level. The 
difficulty is in coordinating 
the process with countries 
showing varying degrees 
of cooperation. Some 
countries play “against the 
clock”… 
NO.  
The top management  
does not question the sales 
targets too much, because 
the sales department has 
considerable influence. 
2.b. Degree of 
formalization of the 
target-setting process 
STRONG.  
Budget is perceived as the 
result of a mathematical 
equation. 
  STRONG.  
Structured process. Targets 
are established based on 
thorough analyses of prices 
and competitors 
STRONG.  
Very long, very detailed 
process. Two very formal 
presentations (like “oral 
exams”!!) 
Formalized process. 
Degree of formalization 
variable across countries. 
STRONG.  





- Table 2 - Target setting Process: difficulty and formalization 
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3. How much 
commitment to the 
target-setting process? 
Does budgeting matter 
to the manager? 
Quite strong commitment,  
Everyone feels responsible 
for his own action plans. 
The organisation is very 
decentralised but entities 
need to convince the 
hierarchy that they are in 
line with strategy. Formal 
presentations to the 
Management Committee. 
 
Quite strong commitment, 
although the budget is seen 
more as a forecast instrument, 
allocation of resources is key: 
area managers come to 
“defend” their budget.  
  Very strong commitment, 
very interactive “Marketing 
Power House”: the budget is 
born of a collective effort, 
going into the details of all 
action plans, with “lots of late 
nights and lots of pizzas” in 
March, very intense process 
 
Growing managerial 
commitment to objectives, 
but the budget follows a 
“cartesian, hierarchical” 
reasoning that remains 
fairly top down… little 
discussion of objectives… 
Strong commitment is sought, 
through transparency and 
teamwork to foster collective 
motivation: “the objectives come 
from the top, that’s what we have 
to achieve as a team, now think it 
over and tell me, you examine 
them and we’ll talk about it” 
 
 




ongoing or one-shot? 
Average,   
2 discussions with teams 
and superiors both up and 
down the line, between 
October and December 
 
Tends to be collaborative, 
with teams and with exclusive 
distributors for each market; 
distributors are often 
overoptimistic so there is some 
critical interaction to bring 
them to take a realistic view. 
This happens between 
October and January. 
Collaborative, with both 
superiors and teams, and 
continuous.  
Strategic and budget factors 
are discussed in advance 
and all year: change 
scenarios are examined, 
without haste.  
However, the final budget 
decision comes from the 




Very collaborative, and more 
importantly very bottom-up.  
The manager’s function is in-
between top-down financial 
pressure and the latest in-field 
knowledge of the sales teams. 
The salespersons’ opinions 
are seriously taken into 
consideration.   
Very little collaborative 
target-setting, little 
discussion, although target 
figures are collective. 
Decisions come down from 
the top. The budgeting 
exercise takes only a short 
time (6 to 8 weeks) and is 
“conscientiously and 
scientifically applied”.  
Interaction exists, but not 
during budgeting. 
Both: very top-down above, 
very strong budget pressure. 
“There’s no point trying to 
challenge the objectives. It won’t 
make any difference, no 
difference at all.” Our interviewee 
feels caught between the 
hammer and the anvil. Extensive 
collective team involvement to 
respond to and compensate for 
this top-down pressure.  
 
 
  Computer services  Transportation  Computer equipment  Food  Packaging  Healthcare 
3. How much 
commitment to the 
target-setting process? 
Does budgeting matter 
to the manager? 
Quite strong commitment.  
Teams are involved in 
target-setting; a well-
balanced model, neither 
too top-down nor too 
bottom-up; the hierarchy are 
prepared to listen, but 
arguments must be 
convincing.  
Strong commitment  
in general from salespersons  
but not necessarily to the 
target-setting process. 
 
Strong commitment on 
targets, given their 
importance for the variable 
portion of salary.  
Many discussions on 
implementation of action 
plans, but the target is 
non-negotiable. 
Mixed:  
strong investment in terms of 
time, high individual 
accountability regarding the 
sales objectives; but 
performance assessment and 
career developments depend 




Strong commitment  
at the European office  
and the budget is the 
principal “time/opportunity” 
for discussion and action on 
countries: but the response 
is very variable, 
depending on the country 
 
Low commitment on  
individual targets:  
individual performance 
assessment does not depend on 
achievement of targets, 
experienced as a collective 
performance.   
 




ongoing or one-shot? 
Fairly collaborative 
process, from November to 
January inclusive: target-
setting is the result of a 
discussion with teams and 
the superior.  
It encompasses overall 
growth objectives, feedback 
from the field, and market 
growth assumptions.  
 
Highly collaborative, 
bottom-up process.  
The sales team has a large 
influence, as the rest of the 
organisation has a completely 
different way of working: they 
bring in a lot of money, so they 
are listened to and trusted. 
Very low-collaborative 
process despite 
appearances (3 discussions 
from July to October). Top 
down objectives are 
imposed and “delivering the 




but objectives are 
“mutualised”: the process 
starts bottom-up, but achieving 
the Group’s objective is 
crucial, so the Marketing 
manager “fixes” things 
internally among brand 
managers, and may decide to 
cut on certain brands… 
10 discussions between May 
and December. 
Target-setting is 
supposed to be based on 
collaboration between 
functions and countries 
(August to late November).  
But some countries are 
hostile to any interference 
They cultivate their 
independence, and despise 
the budget as something 
“for the accountants”.   
 
Very collaborative,  
between mid-June and October, 
in-depth detailed analysis on 
both the figures and action plans, 
with dozens (50) of informal 
discussions between hierarchical 
levels and between Sales and 
Marketing. Performance is seen 
as collective. 
 
- Table 2 - Target setting Process (follows): commitment and collaborative work 
  
DURING THE YEAR  Environment utilities  Beverages  Food/Tobacco  Pharmaceuticals  Equipment  Telecom 
6. During the year, if "off 
track": is information 
shared with superior and 
team? 
YES.  
In any case, it is difficult to 
hide things with three 
forecasts a year… Informal 
reporting discussions with 
the superior and the team. 
 
VARIABLE. 
It can sometimes be difficult 
to get transparency from 
distributors and sales staff 




Continuous discussions, a 




YES. With both the teams 
and the direct superior.  
Very close management 
team, maintaining a high 
level of communication and 
trust; successes and failures 
are borne together. 
However results are not 
reported to the international 
head office (no waste of 




Transparency is a corporate 
value.  
It is not a matter of urgency 
because the markets have 
long cycles, but it is vital for 
the business to spot 
problems early on so a 





unpredictability, there is a 
great concern for 
transparency. Forecasts 
and regular progress reports 
are needed, because rapid 
responses are essential.   
 
7. During the year, if "off 




High degree of 
“mutualisation”: objectives 




Collective identification of 
solutions involving more 
than just the salesperson in 
the field is needed.  
 
YES. 
Possible solutions are 
considered together, and 
shared. 
 
AMBIGUOUS: YES, since 
there is high transparency, 
but a strong sense of 
individual accountability 
remains; our interviewee 
“mutualises” targets 




Highly collective and close 
management; no 
indifference; there is a joint 
search for solutions, which 
are almost always collective 
in this sector. 
 
YES. 
Collective approach to 
solving problems. Rapid 
reactions are essential 
given the large number of 
unanticipated events. 
Quarterly forecasts, with 
new action plans.  
 
 
  Computer services  Transportation  Computer equipment  Food  Packaging  Healthcare 
 
6. During the year, if "off 
track": is information 
shared with superior and 
team? 
YES.   
Transparency is non 
negotiable, the manager 
always reports information 
and has decisions validated 
by the hierarchy. 
 
YES.   
Culture of transparency, no 
use ignoring the signs; what 
counts is the year-end 
result, so reporting and 
sharing setbacks is not a 
problem.  
 
YES.   
Either voluntarily or under 
orders: permanent 
benchmarking with the two 
other major countries in the 
Europe zone.  
Close management and 




Transparency is mandatory: 
to enable the hierarchy to 
reorganise things and ask 
more of others if there is a 
problem with a particular 
product; the overall 






well at European office, but 
the situation with the 
countries is more difficult 
and uneven. Reporting 
structures are being 
progressively introduced. 
 
YES.   
It is technically impossible to 
hide anything. The top 
management is always 
informed “in real time” of 
any problem, through the 
last estimates (monthly 
adjusted forecasts). 
 
7. During the year, if "off 




There is solidarity in 
success and failure (even if 
one individual is 
responsible). Through 
transparency, search for 
support from the hierarchy: 
a joint decision  
 
YES. 
Unconditional support for 
the sales teams, as well as 
a need for rapid reactions.  
But this dialogue does not 
take place as part of the 
budget reporting, which is 
seen as a management 
control tool (“just statistics”). 
 
NO. 
Problem-solving is individual 
and target renegotiation is 
not possible. 
“Mutualisation” was 
experienced only one-way: 
he had been called on to 
compensate for the failings 
of another sector, but there 
was never any let-up in the 
pressure put on him! 
 
AMBIGUOUS. 
Great degree of 
transparency, but superiors 
tend to leave individual 
responsibility for the 
problem with their staff, who 
have to find a solution on 




In the small centralised 
Europe division, problems 
are managed very 
collectively, teamwork 
involving the salesperson 
and marketing, with 
superiors. 
However, it is more difficult 
to help and achieve 
teamwork with the other 
countries. 
YES. 
There is considerable team 
spirit: all sales and market 
personnel are jointly 
responsible for achievement 
of budget objectives. 
Nevertheless, in practice 
responses are fairly slow as 
action plans are “locked-in” 
with customers at least 6 
months in advance.  
 
 






EVALUATION  Environment utilities  Beverages  Food/Tobacco  Pharmaceuticals  Equipment  Telecom 
9. At year-end: do formula-
based incentives work? 
How? 
YES. Variable portion of 15 
to 20% largely based on the 
entity’s objectives, but also 
on division or “area” 
objectives. 
 
NO. Aim to avoid gaming at 
year-end and overstocking 
by distributors. 
One exception is the USA 
subsidiary which has a 
bonus. 
 
YES. Variable portion of 
25%, based on individual 
quantitative objectives 
(profitability), on group 




YES. Large variable portion, 
including 40% to 70% related 
to achievement of budget 
targets. The aim is "spot 
landing”  (to come in right on 
target). 
  
YES. Variable portion of 
20%, including 10% on 
measurable, quantifiable 
collective objectives. The 
superior decides to allocate 
individually or not the team’s 
objective. 
  
YES. Variable portion of 40%  
on average, based 70% on 
measured qualitative 
objectives! Besides, if 
objectives are not met, you 
are “encouraged to look 
elsewhere”. 
 
10. Are there any short-
term subjective rewards? 
How do they work? 
YES. 
Past performance and the 
unpredictability of new 




No short-term bonus,  
but a subjective




Short-term variable portion 
partly based on specified 
individual qualitative 
objectives (e.g. projects, 
behaviour).   
 
YES. 30% of the bonus is 
based on behavioural 
objectives, team spirit and 
qualitative objectives.  
Subjectively assessed by the 
superior, who takes into 
consideration the effort put in 
and the difficulty of targets. 
 
YES. 50% of the bonus is 
based on more qualitative 
individual objectives.  
Collective performance and 
team spirit always take 
precedence. Dismissal may 
result from behaviour, not 
from failure to achieve 
budget targets. 
 
YES. 30% of the bonus 
concerns qualitative 
objectives: this is seen as 
the manager’s “room for 
manoeuvre” to reward effort. 
11. Are there any long-term 
subjective rewards? What 
does a career depend on? 
YES. A career is built on a 
mix of long-term 
performance and personal 
factors. 
YES. This is a family 
business where fair 
evaluation matters a lot. 
 
YES. Achievement of 
objectives is one thing, but 
“there are other criteria” in 
the long term. 
 
YES. Strong emphasis on 
trust, reputation, and 
credibility building developed 
over the years. 
YES. It is possible to miss 
the short-term bonus and 
nevertheless have a good 
career in the company. 
NO. Results are essential for 
career development. 
People with poor results are 
“encouraged” to leave. 
 
  Computer services  Transportation  Computer equipment  Food  Packaging  Healthcare 
9. At year-end: do 
formula-based incentives 
work? How? 
YES. Sales force’s variable 
portion of 30% to 40%.  
Bonus applies for quantitative 
objectives only, in proportion 
to achievement of results.  
YES.  Sales force’s variable 
portion of 10% to 15%. 
YES. Sales force’s variable 
portion of 60%, based solely 
on top-down sales targets. 
 
VARIABLE, depending on 
the hierarchical level 
YES for the marketing 
manager and above, based 
on sales revenue targets;  
NO below.  
 
 
YES. Large variable portion. 
Trigger: individual bonuses are 
only negotiable if the overall 
objective is met.  
 
NO. Achievement of sales 
targets is not taken into 
consideration in 
salespersons’ pay. The 
individual evaluation is 




10. Are there any short-
term subjective rewards? 
How do they work? 
NO. 
Apparently no great success… 
 
N.A.   
 
NO. YES.  For levels below the 
marketing manager, pay 
rises are distributed at 
his/her discretion, mainly 
taking personal qualities into 
consideration. 
NOT REALLY. The bonus 
partly depends on qualitative, 
but generally measurable 
objectives.  
However, due to the “trigger 
system”, “everybody is in the 
same boat”. 
YES.  Individual 
performance objectives 
concern skill developments. 
The highly developed team 
spirit is also reflected in 
collective rewards. 
11. Are there any long-
term subjective rewards? 
What does a career 
depend on? 
NO. Only the results count… YES.  Only the superior can 
take people forward in their 
career (or not), depending 
on their "performance". 
NO. Only results matter for 
career development: no 
more than one mistake or 
failure. 
 
 YES. The career depends 




YES. The career is determined 
by the successive annual 
evaluation interviews 
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